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CORPORATE PROXY CONTESTS: EXPENSES OF
MANAGEMENT AND INSURGENTS*
Edward Ross Aranow
and
Herbert A. Einhornt
I
One of the most important advantages available to management in a
proxy contest is its ready access to the corporate treasury to defray many
of the expenses of waging the contest. These expenses have tended to
become more and more substantial as campaigns -have become more intense and elaborate. The fees of lawyers, accountants, security analysts,
public relations experts and professional proxy solicitors, together with
the expenses of printing, mailing, telephones, telegraph, travel and administrative personnel run into many thousands of dollars. However,
the right to use corporate funds for such purposes is not unlimited, and
management should be familiar with the limitations under which it must
operate before it embarks on an extensive, and usually expensive,
campaign.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND REQUIREMENTS

The right of management to use corporate funds in a proxy contest is
not regulated by state or federal statute.' Consequently, we must look
to common law principles and judicial authority.
The principles applicable to the right of an incumbent management to
use corporate funds in a proxy contest are substantially the same as those
generally applicable to the use of corporate property. One of these
general principles is that corporate property may be used only for a
corporate purpose; that is, in furtherance of the interests or activities of
the corporation. Any other purpose is considered "ultra vires." 2
* This article is based on chapters of a forthconing book by the authors to be published
by the Columbia University Press under the title "Proxy Contests for Corporate Control."
Irving Novick, A.B. Tufts, 1951, LL.B. New York University, 1954 and Lloyd Singer, B.I.E.
Syracuse, 1950, LL.B. New York University, 1954, assisted in the preparation of this article.
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 74 for biographical data.
1 An exception exists in the power of the Securities and Exchange Commission to regulate
proxy solicitation expenses under Section 12(e) of the Public Utilities Holding Company
Act, 49 Stat. 824 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 791(c) (1952), discussed p. 14 infra.
2 "When acts of corporations are spoken of as ultra vires, it is not intended that they
are unlawful or even such as the corporation cannot perform, but merely those which are not
within the powers conferred upon the corporation by the act of its creation, and are in
violation of the trust reposed in the managing board by the shareholders, that the affairs
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A related principle is that an incumbent management may not use
corporate funds for personal as distinguished from corporate purposes;
and that the expenditure of corporate funds by a management for the
sole or primary purpose of retaining control of the corporation is illegal. 3
The application of these general principles to proxy contests has presented problems; and the problems have multiplied as proxy contests
have increased in scope, intensity and importance, involving elaborate
campaigns, public relations counsel, professional proxy solicitors and
other specialists.
There is general agreement that 'a corporate management is under a
duty to arrange for the holding of stockholders' meetings, the sending of
notices pertaining to the meetings, and informing the stockholders with
respect to corporate affairs and matters to be considered at such meetings.4 Accordingly, it is well recognized that management has the right
to expend corporate funds, in reasonable amounts, for such limited corporate purposes.5 This right exists regardless of the absence or imminence of a contest,6 although the question of "reasonableness" of exshall be managed and the funds applied solely for carrying out the objects for which the
corporation was created." Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N.Y. 62, 68 (1875). As to
misuse of term "ultra vires," see 7 Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations § 3399 (Perm. ed.
1952). "The expression 'ultra vires' has been used by courts and writers in various meanings resulting in much confusion." Ballantine, Corporations § 89 (1946).
3 Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. L. & R. Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.B. 199
(1907); Peel v. London & Northwestern Ry., [1907] 1 Ch. D. 5 (CA. 1906): ".... but where
the expenditures are solely for the personal interest of the directors to maintain themselves
in office expenditures made in their campaign for proxies are not proper." Hall v. TransLux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 At. 226 (Ch. 1934). See also
cases cited infra note S.
4 5 Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations §§ 1997, 2006, 2007 et seq. (Perm. ed. 1952).
When directors adopt a policy and that policy is questioned by others, they have "the positive duty to inform the shareholders" of their reasons for the policy and why they think
the policy should be continued. Peel v. London & Northwestern Ry. [1907] 1 Ch. D. 5

(CA. 1906).
5 Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe
Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (D.C. Del. 1944) ; Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp.,
20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 Ati. 226 (Ch. 1934); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.,
309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955); McGoldrick v. Segal, 124 N.Y.L.J. 461, col. 2 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1950), aff'd without opinion, 99 N.Y.S.2d (1st Dep't 1950); In re Zickl,
73 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.,County 1947); Peel v. London & Northwestern Ry., [19071
1 Ch. D. 5 (CA. 1906). See also, Empire Southern Gas Co. v. Gray, 29 Del. Ch. 95, 46 A.2d
741 (Ch. 1946); Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. L. & R. Co., 187 N.Y. 395,
80 N.E. 199 (1907); Kadel v. Segal Lock & Hardware Co., 130 N.Y.UJ. 488, col. 4 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1953); Appeal Printing Co. v. Segal Lock & Hardware Co., 128 N.Y.LJ.
1563, col. 3 (N.Y. City Ct. 1952).

6 "If directors of a corporation may not in good faith incur reasonable and proper expenses in soliciting proxies in these days of giant corporations with vast numbers of stock-

holders, the corporate business might be seriously interfered with because of stockholder in-
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penditures is likely to be influenced by the existing facts and circumstances.
The problems become more complex when a contest is waged and
where an incumbent management undertakes to defend its record and
policies in order to obtain stockholders' support and thereby continue in
control of the corporation.
A supposedly easy line of demarcation was adopted in the 1906 English case of Peel v. London & Northwestern Railway.' In upholding
management's use of corporate funds in a contest, the Court pointed out
that the questions at issue were "questions of policy affecting the conduct of the business of the corporation, and had nothing whatever to do
with the directors as individuals." 8
Most American cases which have considered the right to use corporate
funds in a proxy contest have adopted the requirement that the contest
involve corporate policy rather than a struggle for personal power or
position.9 The cases decided under Delaware law have generally taken
this "policy" approach and have sanctioned management's use of corporate funds in defending its "policies" and in vying for stockholder
approval and support.' A Delaware Court, in stating the principle, said:
I gather the principle from these authorities to be that where reasonable
expenditures are in the interest of an intelligent exercise of judgment on
the part of the stockholders upon policies to be pursued, the expenditures
are proper; but where the expenditures are solely in the personal interest
of the directors to maintain themselves in office, expenditures made in their
campaign for proxies are not proper."
As will be seen in the next section, this approach, followed by a finding
that matters of policy were involved, has resulted in a reluctance on the
part of the courts to interfere with or disallow expenditures which the
directors believed to be reasonably necessary to conduct a proxy contest
involving issues of policy."2
difference and the difficulty of procuring a quorum, where there is no contest." Rosenfeld
v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 172-73, 128 N.E.2d 291, 292 (1955)
(emphasis added).
7 [19071 1 Ch. D. 5 (CA. 1906).
8 Id. at 18.
9 Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight
Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 At. 226 (Ch. 1934) ; Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine
& Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
10 Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (applying Delaware law);
Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (D.C. Del. 1944); Empire Southern Gas Co. v. Gray, 29 Del. Ch. 95, 46 A.2d 741 (Ch. 1946); Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight
Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 Adt. 226 (Ch. 1934).
11 Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 84, 171 Ad. 226,
228 (Ch. 1934).
12 See lower court decision by Referee in Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.,
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However, at least one court, applying the Delaware law and following
the policy approach, has criticized the latter as being artificial and unsound. The Federal Court in the case of Steinberg v. Adams, 13 stated:
The simple fact, of course, is that generally policy and personnel do not
exist in separate compartments. A change in personnel is sometimes indispensable to a change of policy. A new board may be the symbol of
14
the shift in policy as well as the means of obtaining it.
The New York cases and doctrine are more uncertain, primarily because of the "Delphic Oracle" decision and the opinions by the Court
of Appeals in 1955 in Rosenfeld v. FairchildEngine & Airplane Corporation.' 5 Prior to the decision in the Fairchild case, the only New York
Court of Appeals case dealing with the problem was Lawyers' Advertising
Co. v. Consolidated Railway Lighting & Refrigerating Co., decided in
1907. "

In the Lawyers' Advertising case, the corporation was sued for the
cost of four newspaper advertisements ordered by the corporation's
secretary. The first advertisement was inserted on order of the board of
directors and carried the notice of a special meeting to resolve a conflict which had developed between the board and the president. Proxies
were being solicited by both groups. The other three advertisements
were inserted by the secretary without specific board authorization and
dealt with the contest issues and urged the stockholders to return the
directors' proxies. The Court held that the corporation was liable only
for the first notice, because publication of the other three notices was
not authorized by the board of directors; but then the Court also stated
that publication could not have been lawfully authorized even if the attempt were made. The Court mentioned that these three notices were
not "legitimately incidental to the meeting or necessary for the protection of the stockholders" because they were an "urgent solicitation that
these proxies should be executed and returned for use by one faction in
its contest, and we think there is no authority for imposing the expense
116 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1954) (applies "business judgment" rule in
refusing to pass on reasonableness of the proxy solicitation expenses).
13 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), 36 Cornell L.Q. 558 (1951), 49 Mich. L. Rev. 605
(1951), 61 Yale L.J. 229 (1952).
14 90 F. Supp. at 608. See also dissent in Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.,
309 N.Y. 168, 176, 128 N.E.2d 291, 295 (1955), in which the dissenting judge comments on
and approves the above view as to the impracticability of distinguishing between matters of
policy and matters purely personal in proxy contests.
15 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). Notes, 41 Cornell L.Q. 714 (1956); 56 Colum.
L. Rev. 633 (1956); 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1132 (1956); 31'N.Y.U.L. Rev. 825 (1956).
16 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907).
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The Court further stated that

...too dangerous a rule to permit directors in control of a corporation
and engaged in a contest for the perpetuation of their offices and control,

to impose upon the corporation the unusual expense of publishing advertise-

ments or, by analogy, of dispatching special messengers for the purpose of

procuring proxies in their behalf. 18
Subsequent cases decided by lower New York Courts attempted to
distinguish the Lawyers' Advertising case and tended to follow the more
liberal approach of the Delaware cases based on a finding that the contest involved issues over policy.' 9
In 1-955, the New York Court of Appeals rendered a four to three
2 0 The plaindecision in Rosenfeld v. FairchildEngine & Airplane Corp.
tiff in that case brought a derivative stockholder's action to compel the
return of $261,522 paid out of the corporate treasury to reimburse both
sides for their expenses in a proxy contest. The incumbent board, while
still in office, spent $106,000 of corporate funds in defense of its position.
After the insurgents won the contest, the new board paid $28,000 to the
old board to cover a balance of such expenses. In addition, $127,556 was
paid to the insurgents to compensate them for their expense in conducting the proxy fight. This payment was approved by the new board and
expressly ratified by a large majority of the stockholders. The items
which were reimbursed included expenditures for printing, stationery,
postage, public relations counsel, professional proxy solicitors, legal
counsel, entertainment, chartered airplanes and limousines. The plaintiff
did not question the reasonableness of the amounts spent for the various
items, but argued that the use of corporate funds to pay such items was
utterly illegal and ultra vires. The trial judge (Official Referee) dismissed the complaint on several grounds, including failure of proof, ratification by stockholders, and judicial unwillingness to substitute its own
judgment for the directors' business judgment."' The appellate division,
on appeal, affirmed the judgment of dismissal because of (1) failure to
prove impropriety of specific items and (2) stockholders' ratification. 2
On appeal to the highest court of New York, the Court of Appeals,
17 Id. at 399, 80 N.E. at 201.
18 Ibid.

19 Kadel v. Segal Lock & Hardware Co., 130 N.Y.LJ. 488, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1953); Appeal Printing Co. v. Segal Lock & Hardware Co., 128 N.Y.L.J. 1563, co]. 3 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1952); MtGoldrick v. Segal, 124 N.Y.L.J. 461, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950)
aff'd without opinion sub nom. Blum v. Segal, 277 App. Div. 963, 99 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1st
Dep't 1950); In re Zickl, 73 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
20 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
See also notes cited supra note 15.
21 116 N.Y.S.2d 840 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1952).
22 284 App. Div. 201, 132 N.Y.S.2d 273 (2d Dep't 1954), 24 U. Cin. L. Rev. 606 (1955).

PROXY CONTEST EXPENSES

four to three, upheld the dismissal of the complaint 3 Three of the four
prevailing judges2" who voted to affirm the lower courts did so on the
ground that management, in a contest over "policy," could expend reasonable sums to defend its position; and that the reasonableness of the particular items was not involved because plaintiffs did not undertake to
prove the unreasonableness of such items.2 5 The same three judges were
of the same opinion with respect to the expenses of the successful insurgents, basing their affirmance on the approval by a majority of the
stockholders of those expenses.
The fourth judge26 who joined in affirming the lower courts, based his
opinion solely on the ground that plaintiff failed to prove that the particular items of expenditure were improper. He mentioned that payment
by the corporation of the expenses of one faction in a contest for the
control of the corporation was ultra vires and cites the Lawyers' Advertising case as authority. Moreover, he stated that if an item was improper or illegal, ratification by stockholders (unless unanimous) would
27
be of no effect.
The three dissenting judges2" were of the opinion that the complaint
should not have been dismissed, and that the trial court should have
required the directors to justify the various expenditures. They stated
that, in their opinion, the right of incumbent directors to use corporate
funds in a proxy contest should be limited to expenses covering the giving
of notice of the meeting and informing the stockholders of the issues;
and should not include other "campaign" expenses. They criticized the
distinction between "policy" and "personnel" as being impracticable
because of the impossibility of separating the two. They further stated
that the insurgents, even if successful, should not be entitled to any re29
imbursement whatsoever, regardless of stockholder approval.
23 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). See also notes cited supra note 15.
24 Conway, Ch. J., Froessel, J. (who wrote the opinion), and Burke J.
25 The court distinguishes Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. L. & R. Co.,
supra, by stating that in that case it was expressly found that the proxy contest there involved was "by one faction in its contest with another for the control of a corporation ...
a contest for the perpetuation of their officers and control." 309 N.Y. 168, 172, 128 N.E.2d
291, 292 (1955).
26 Desmond, J.
27 309 N.Y. 168, 174, 128 N.E.2d 291, 294 (1955).

The concurring judge continued to

state his general views on the questions of corporate reimbursement of proxy solicitation
expenses by quoting extensively from the Lawyers' Advertising case, and ended with this
final comment: "[Slince expenditures which do not meet the test of propriety are intrinsically unlawful, it could not be any answer ... that the stockholder vote which purported to
authorize them was heavy or that the change in management turned out to be beneficial to
the corporation." Id. at 176, 128 N.E.2d at 295.
28 Van Voorhis, J. (who wrote the dissenting opinion), Dye, J. and Fuld, J.
29 309 N.Y. 168, 176, 128.N.E.2d 291, 295 (1955).
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Thus, only three of the four judges who approved the dismissal of
the complaint in the Fairchild case expressly adopted the "policy" approach of the Delaware cases. The fourth judge, who concurred only in
result, did not expressly adopt this approach, but indicated approval of
the strict and limited doctrine of the Lawyers' Advertising case. The
three dissenting judges expressly rejected the "policy" approach and
continued to apply the strict limitations of the Lawyers' Advertising case.
It is difficult to predict how the New York courts hereafter will interpret and apply the doctrine of the Fairchild case. Clarification by the
Court of Appeals undoubtedly is necessary. It may well be that the
enactment of a statute, after careful study of this complex problem, will
be the more satisfactory solution. In the meanwhile, it is probable that
the immediate effect of the Fairchildcase will be to cause the New York
courts to scrutinize more closely all expenditures in proxy contests, both
as to nature and amount; and that incumbent managements must be prepared to justify the reasonableness of such expenditures.
The possible differences between the New York and Delaware rules
give rise to the important question of which law is to control. Suppose a
derivative action is brought in a New York State court or in a federal
court on behalf of a corporation organized in Delaware?
The rule as applied by the federal district court in the Steinberg case
is that the law of the state of incorporation governs.8 0 The basis of this
rule is the proposition that internal corporate matters such as duties,
powers and fiduciary relation of directors, as well as the rules of "ultra
vires," are normally decided under the law of the domicile of the
corporation.

1

PERMISSIBLE EXPENDITURES BY MANAGEMENT

The nature and extent of the expenses which management, in a proxy
contest, may pay out of corporate funds, will depend to a certain extent
upon the general doctrine applied.
If the "policy" approach is taken, as applied by the Delaware courts
30 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). "The instant case is concerned with the Delaware
corporation and the laws of that state determine the scope of the corporation's power." Id.
at 60s.
33 "Purely internal corporate affairs and management are governed by the law of the
state of creation." 17 Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations § 8326 (Perm. ed. 1933) ; Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 197 (1934). "When a corporation goes into another sovereignty or
state and is permitted to do business there, its powers under its charter provisions are controlled by the law of domicile." 6 Id. § 2501; but note conflicting decisions as to the various
aspects of this subject, 6 Id. Chapter 24. It is to be noted that the Fairchild Engine & Airplane Company is a Maryland corporation. This fact is not mentioned in any of the decisions, nor does it appear to have been specifically pleaded. This may be explained by the
lack of Maryland law on this subject.

1956]

PROXY CONTEST EXPENSES

and the three of the four prevailing judges of the New York Court of
Appeals in the Fairchild case, 2 "corporate directors have the right to
make reasonable and proper expenditures, subject to the scrutiny of the
courts when duly challenged, from the corporate treasury for the purpose of persuading the stockholders of the correctness of their position
and soliciting their support for policies which the directors believe, in
good faith, are in the best interests of the corporation." 33
On the other hand, if the doctrine applied is that of the Lawyers' Advertising case,34 approved by the three dissenting judges in the Fairchild
case and to a certain extent by the fourth judge who concurred only in
result with the other three prevailing judges, management's permissible
expenditures would be limited to reasonable sums incurred for the purpose of "informing the stockholders fully and fairly concerning the
affairs and policies of the corporation, which may well include an explanation of the reasons on account of which its policies have been
undertaken" and employment of solicitors to obtain proxies from apathetic stockholders "so as to insure a quorum. 3 5
When we consider the propriety of specific items customarily expended
by a management in a proxy contest, we find that the cases are enlightening only to a limited extent.
1. Notice of Meeting and Proxy Statement. It is considered axiomatic
that an incumbent management is under a duty to arrange for stockholders' meetings and to inform the stockholders with respect to special
corporate affairs to be discussed at that meeting.3 6 This duty exists even
where there is no proxy contest. 37 Consequently, all authorities, regardless of doctrine, agree that management may incur reasonable expenses
in connection with giving notice of the meeting and informing the stockholders, by proxy statement or otherwise, with respect to the corporation's affairs and issues to'be considered.38 These would include printing
and postage expenses, both for mailing of the material and return of
proxies,3 9 and also publication of the notice of the meeting"0 and any
adjournments of the meeting.
32 Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
33 Id. at 173, 128 N.E.2d at 293.
34 Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. L. & R. Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199

(1907).
35 309 N.Y. at 186-87, 128 N.E.2d at 301.

36 5 Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations § 1997 (Perm. ed. 1952).
37 Ibid. See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d
291 (1955) (both the prevailing and dissenting judges agreed as to this question).
38 See note 5 supra.
39 Peel v. London & Northwestern Ry., [1907] 1 Ch. D. 5 (CA. 1906).
40 Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. L. & R. Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199
(1907). See also Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.W. 1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 42

2. Expenses of Conducting the Meeting. Since the management is required to arrange for the holding of stockholders' meetings, it would seem
that reasonable expenses in connection with the actual conduct of the
meeting would also be proper. These would include rental for a meeting
place if reasonably necessary or desirable under the circumstances;
stenographic charges to keep a record of the proceedings; lunch or refreshments for stockholders attending the meeting; and the expenses of
the inspectors of election, and those assisting them, in connection with
the examination and counting of the proxies and tabulation of the vote.
3. Proxy Solicitors. The use of professional solicitors in large proxy
contests has become almost 'universal. As far as the conduct of the contest is concerned, they perform a necessary and valuable service.41
It appears that, regardless of doctrine, proxy solicitors may be employed to contact apathetic stockholders to obtain their proxies in order
to insure a quorum.4" However, the employment of proxy solicitors in a
proxy contest for the purpose of persuading or reminding the stockholders to send in their proxies to the management has raised problems.
In the Fairchildcase, the cost of proxy solicitors was included among
the expenses which were attacked by the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not
question the amount of the expense, but claimed that it was illegal.
Three of the four prevailing judges held that since no question of reasonableness was raised, the expenses incurred were not illegal. The fourth
of the prevailing judges merely took the position that the plaintiff had
failed to sustain the burden of proof when he failed to introduce evidence
43
attacking specific items.
I A lower New York court in 1947 approved the expenditure of cor4 the insurgents
porate funds to pay proxy solicitors. In In re Zickl,4
sought to have the re-election of the management's slate of directors set
aside on the ground that the management hadspent $3,000 of corporate
funds in following up solicitation by paid proxy solicitors. The court
held that such use of corporate funds was not only proper, but was contemplated by the SEC proxy rules which provide for certain detailed dis45
closure if professional solicitors are employed.
41 The study of 48 contests in 1951 and 1952 disclosed that twelve non-management
groups had employed professional solicitors. Emerson & Latcham, "Proxy Contests: A Study
in Shareholder Sovereignty," 41 Calif. L. Rev. 393, 418 (1953). Professional solicitors were
employed by both sides in the 1954 contest involving the New York Central & New Haven
Railroads. They were also employed by both sides in the 1955 Montgomery Ward contest.
42 Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
43 judge Desmond did, however, quote language from the Lawyers' Advertising case which
disapproved of "special messengers." Id. at 176, 128 N.E.2d at 295.
44 73 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
45 Schedule 14A, Item 3, 17 C.F.R. p. 232 (1949). The court's reasoning was sharply
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On the other hand, there has been considerable criticism or condemnation of the use of corporate funds to pay for proxy solicitors.46
The New York Court of Appeals in the Lawyers' Advertising case, by
way of dictum, indicated that it disapproved "of dispatching special
messengers for the purpose of procuring proxies in their (management's)
behalf. '4 7 The opinion of the three dissenting judges in the Fairchild
case makes it clear that they considered it illegal for corporate funds to
be used to employ proxy solicitors for any purpose other than that of
contacting apathetic stockholders to insure a quorum. Their opinion said:
There is a difference between hiring solicitors merely to follow up proxy
and a high pressure campaign to secure
notices so as to obtain a quorum,
48
votes by personal contact.

The opinion further stated:
The way is open and will be kept open for stockholders and groups of
stockholders to contest corporate elections, but if the promoters of such
movements choose to employ the costly modem media of mass persuasion,
to themselves and to the stockholders
they should look for reimbursement
49
who are aligned with them.

And, again:
...nor is there any reason on account of which stockholders who have neglected to sign proxies through apathy may not be solicited so as to insure
a quorum, which would ordinarily occur in instances where there is no
contest, but beyond measures of this character, the purely campaign expenses of a management group~do not serve a corporate purpose, and paying them is ultra vires.50
Writers on the subject appear to agree in viewing the expenses of professional proxy solicitors as "unreasonable."'" One writer makes the following comment:
criticized by one writer who pointed out the existence of the disclosure rule did not indicate
the Commission's approval of professional solicitation, for it merely required full disclosure that that method was employed. See Mintz, "Use of Corporate Funds to Pay for
Proxies and Other Expenses in Fight over Corporate Management," 8 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev.
90, 92 (1953). Accord, Latcham & Emerson, "Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholder
Democracy," 4 Western Res. L. Rev. 5 (1952); Note, 61 Yale L.J. 229, 236 (1951).
46 See Pittsburgh Steel v. Walker, 92 Pitt. L.J. 464 (C.P. Allegheny County 1944) (dismissing preliminary objections to bill in equity which alleged management's improper use of
corporate funds in employing professional proxy solicitors to have themselves elected at the
annual meeting).
47 187 N.Y. 395, 399, 80 N.E. 199, 200 (1907).
48 309 N.Y. 168, 182, 128 N.E.2d 291, 295 (1955).
49 Id. at 186, 128 N.E.2d at 301.
50 Id. at 187, 128 N.E.2d at 301.
51 Latcham & Emerson, "Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholder Democracy," 4 Western
Res. L. Rev. 5 (1952); Friedman, "Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests," 51 Colum. L.
Rev. 951 (1951); 'Mintz, "Use of Corporate Funds for Proxies and Other Expenses in
Fight over Corporate Management," 8 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev. 90 (1953).
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The information whose dissemination to stockholders justifies corporate
financing of management proxy expenses can be presented adequately
through distribution of printed matter, and there is no need for amplification by individual contact. And, once the stockholders have been fully
informed, the process of vigorous persuasion that is the task of the52 paid
solicitor goes beyond the bounds of proper corporate expenditures.
As mentioned above, a lower New York court referred to the SEC

proxy rules as indicating the Commission's approval of the employment
of professional proxy solicitors.53 Some insight into the Commission's
view on this matter can be had from a study of a Commission decision
in 1946 under the Public Utility Holding Company Act. It must be
pointed out, however, that the power of the Commission to regulate
proxy solicitations of public utility holding companies under section 12 (e)
of that Act54 is more extensive than its power over companies under
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.55 The broader
scope of the regulation is seen in Rule U-655 6 which limits management's
solicitation expenses to the ordinary expenditures of preparing and mailing the proxies and statements plus other expenditures not in excess of
$1,000 for any one year. However, the Commission can by order approve additional expenditures if the management files a declaration listing the proposed expenditures and requesting Commission approval.
In a 1946 case,57 the management of a holding company filed such a
declaration estimating its solicitation expenses to be $21,000, including
a $3,500 fee and $5,000 disbursements td a professional proxy soliciting
firm. The declaration was opposed by a group of stockholders who
planned to solicit proxies in opposition to the management. In its decision, the Commission pointed out that Rule U-65 was promulgated for
the purpose of "preventing excesses and abuses in the expenditure of
corporate funds in a proxy campaign." 58s The Commission found that no
adequate cause had been shown for permitting the management to expend
corporate funds to employ paid solicitors to aid the management in waging its fight against the opposite faction, and therefore, its expenditures
were limited to those allowed by Rule U-65.11
52 Friedman, supra note 51, at 954-55.
53 In re Zickl, 73 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
54 49 Stat. 824 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1952).

55 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1952).
56 17 C.F.R. § 250.65 (1949).
57 Matter of Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 24 S.E.C. 337 (1946), SEC Holding Co. Act. Rel.

No. 7020, Dec. 2, 1946.
58 Id. at 341. A Commission release indicates that the employment of professional
solicitors was the expenditure specifically aimed at in the adoption of Rule U-65. SEC
Holding Co. Act. Rel. No. 2681, April 9, 1941.
59 The Commission infers that it would approve the employment of professional solicitors
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This 1946 case indicates that the Commission did not then believe
the employment of professional solicitors to be a "reasonable" expense
under the circumstances. However, it must be remembered that Commission policies have been altered with changes in personnel, and there
is no certainty that this decision represents the current Commission view.
Although no case has specifically so decided, it appears that under the
Delaware rule reasonable expenditures may be made for professional
proxy solicitors.6' In New York, however, under the Fairchildcase, there
is considerable doubt as to the propriety of employing solicitors for anything but quorum purposes. Yet it seems that the courts in New York
will feel obliged to recognize corporate realities and permit expenditure
of reasonable sums for such purpose. If the courts do not do so, the
61
legislature may well do so by statutory enactment.
4. Public Relations Experts. The propriety of charging the corporation for the expense of a public relations firm is not clear. The items
challenged by the plaintiff in the Fairchildcase included expenses of public relations counsel. Three of the four prevailing judges in the Fairchild
case apparently believed that payment of public relations experts is nbt
necessarily illegal but is subject to scrutiny as to "reasonableness." The
three dissenting judges undoubtedly disapproved of the use of corporate
funds to pay such expenses. The fourth of the prevailing judges, who
concurred in result only, did not express his views with respect to individual items, but quoted from the language of the Lawyers' Advertising
case. Since the court in the Lawyers' Advertising case indicated that it
disapproved of the use of proxy solicitors, it probably would place public
relations experts in the same category.
if it were shown that their services were necessary to insure a quorum at the meeting. It is
true that if the proxies are solicited for a routine meeting where there is no opposition to
management, stockholder indifference may result in failure to secure sufficient proxies to
meet the quorum required. However, if a contest is in progress and the stockholders are
bombarded with charges and counter-charges, it is doubtful if any such problem coulddevelop. Certain other types of corporate action require the approval of a specified percentage of the outstanding stock. Some examples are an alteration of voting rights, merger,
consolidation, and sale of assets. In these situations, the services of professional proxy
solicitors may be essential, even if no opposition has developed, and the use of corporate
funds for solicitors is clearly justified. See Friedman, supra note 51, at 954.
60 See Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (D. Del. 1944) (stating
that no Delaware case has decided on propriety of using professional proxy solicitors). But
see Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine &
Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
61 A bill was recently introduced in the New York Legislature, however, which would
have exactly the opposite effect, viz. to prevent the expenditure of corporate assets in the
solicitation of stockholders. New York State Bar Ass'n Circular No. 97, Jan. 30, 1956. This
bill has been characterized as an "extreme reaction," Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1132, 1134
(1956), and in the opinion of the authors stands very little chance of adoption.
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Those writers who condemn professional solicitors as a non-essential,
high pressure campaign tactic,62 would probably classify public relations
counsel in the same way. Their argument would be that corporate funds
are properly expended to inform the stockholders of the contest issues
and this dissemination of information can be accomplished adequately
without the assistance of public relations experts. On the other hand, it
is conceivable that in a situation involving a large corporation, with
many thousands of stockholders who are widely scattered, the services of
a public relations expert may be found to be reasonably necessary for
effective dissemination of information to the stockholders. Undoubtedly,
this would depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
5. Legal Counsel. There is very little discussion in the cases with
respect to the propriety of payment of the fees of legal counsel in a proxy
contest. It would seem, however, that management clearly has the right
to use corporate funds for the payment of reasonable fees in such a
situation. The services and advice of counsel are usually necessary in
connection with the calling of the meeting, preparation and filing of
proxy statements, determining the validity of proxies, and the conduct
of the meeting.6 3 Such services appear to be closely related to the performance of management's duty to give notice of the meeting, to inform
the stockholders of the corporation's affairs and issues to be considered,
and to cbnvene and hold the meeting.
Theoretically, management would have no right to use corporate funds
to pay for legal services rendered solely or primarily for "personal campaign purposes."6 As a practical matter, however, it probably would be
very difficult, in most cases, to so isolate and identify legal services.
6. Accountants and Security Analysts. None of the cases has discussed the propriety of using corporate funds for the payment of fees of
accountants or security analysts in a proxy contest. Situations may well
arise where the employment of accountants or security analysts will be
deemed reasonably necessary to inform the stockholders of the corporation's affairs and the issues presented. Obviously this will depend upon
the nature of the contest and the specific issues raised.
7. Corporate Employees. In bitterly contested or close contests,
See supra notes 51, 52, 53.
But see Kadel v. Segal Lock & Hardware Co., 138 N.Y.L.J. 488, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1953), where the Court questioned the propriety of charging to the corporation
the expenses of a legal proceeding, on behalf of management, to enjoin the voting of
certain proxies.
64 Kadel v. Segal Lock & Hardware Co., 138 N.Y.L.J. 488, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1953). See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291
(1955) (both the prevailing and dissenting judges agreed on this question).
62
63
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managements of large corporations have often used the services of
various employees in their organization. These services have ranged all
the way from the performance of clerical and ministerial duties to public
relations work and the solicitation of proxies. Efforts have been made
by insurgent groups to obtain a court order restraining the corporation
from using employees for campaign purposes. 65 It would seem that the
diversion of corporate employees from the performance of their regular
corporate duties to active participation in the campaign may well be
criticized as an improper use of corporate "assets."
YARDSTICK OF REASONABLENESS

The requirement of "reasonableness," as to both nature and amount
of expenditures, is imposed under the cases following the "policy" approach. It also is imposed, but to a more limited extent, under the
Lawyers' Advertising case as approved by the dissenting judges and the
fourth concurring judge in the Fairchild case.66 The courts emphasized
that the expenditures by management in a proxy contest are subject to
judicial scrutiny with respect to their reasonableness.
However, the yardstick of "reasonableness" is, of necessity, most indefinite and elastic. It obviously will be said to vary with the facts and
circumstances of each case. It is probable that some courts will resort
to an approach similar to the "business judgment" approach in
stockholders' derivative actions and will be reluctant to superimpose their
own views as to reasonableness except in clear and manifestly flagrant
cases. An example of such reluctance may be found in the opinion of the
Official Referee in the Fairchildcase. He said:
If any of these defendants had a personal interest in wbat was transpiring,
and which interest was adverse to that of the corporation, then the courts
might be justified in appraising the reasonableness of the expenditures
made by them. However, I know of no case which justifies a judge sitting
as trier of the facts to substitute his judgment for the so-called "business
judgment rule" .... Whether or not the expenditures made were reasonable
depends upon so many elements that it is impossible to define them all.
One must consider the size of the corporation, its capitalization, the number
of shares outstanding, the number of shareholders, the benefits flowing to
them as a result of the contest. And if one were to delve further one would
also have to consider the reasonableness of the compensation paid to the
67
attorneys, to the soliciting agencies and to the public relations counsel.
65 In the 1955 Libby, McNeil & Libby proxy contest, an action was brought but was discontinued due to lack of time. See also Matter of Standard Gas & Elec. Co., supra note 57,
where the Commission directed that the use of corporate employees come within $1,000
maximum expenses allowed to management for proxy solicitation under the Public Utilities
Holding Company Act of 1935.
66 309 N.Y. 168, 176, 128 N.E.2d 291, 295 (1955).
67 116 N.Y.S.2d 840, 849 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1952).
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Although both the appellate division and Court of Appeals indicated that
the reasonableness of expenditures would very definitely be subject to
court scrutiny, it nevertheless is probable that some judges will approach
the determination of reasonableness with the same reluctance as did the
Official Referee in the Fairchildcase; they will feel impelled to hold an
expenditure to be unreasonable only when the facts clearly so indicate.
Morover, as indicated by the opinion of all four prevailing judges in the
Fairchildcase, the burden of going forward to prove unreasonableness is
on the plaintiff, and the incumbent directors are not required to justify
their expenditures until the plaintiff has come forward with proof of
unreasonableness.

68

It thus appears that a stockholder who undertakes to challenge the
reasonableness of expenses incurred by management in a proxy contest
must be fully prepared to go forward with clear, detailed and persuasive
evidence in support of his position.
II
As already indicated, the expenses of conducting a proxy contest
usually are very substantial. Management, subject to certain limitations,
has ready access to the corporate treasury. The insurgents, however,
must defray their own expenses. To what extent are they entitled to
reimbursement if (a) they are successful; (b) they are partially successful; (c) they are unsuccessful?
REIMBURSEMENT OF SUccESSFUL INSURGENTS

The right of successful insurgents to be reimbursed for their reasonable expenses in a proxy contest has been decided in only two cases.
In each case, reimbursement was ratified by a majority of the stockholders, and in each case such reimbursement was upheld.
The first case was Steinberg v. Adams,69 decided in 1950 by a federal
court in New York on the basis of Delaware law. This case resulted from
the 1947 contest for control of the Thompson-Starrett Company, which
was won by the insurgent group of stockholders. During the contest, the
management group spent $20,110 of corporate funds for its expenses.
After taking control, the insurgents reimbursed themselves out of corporate funds for $27,755 they had spent in the contest. This action of
the new board was ratified by a majority vote of the stockholders.
68 309 N.Y. 168, 176, 128 N.E.2d 291, 295 (1955). The three dissenting judges would
have placed the burden of going forward on the incumbent directors. For further discussion of the burden of proof in these cases, see Note, 41 Cornell L.Q. 714, 720-21 (1956).
This Note approves the position taken by the dissent.
69 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Comment, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 605 (1951); Note, 36
Cornell L.Q. 558 (1951).
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A stockholders' derivative action was instituted, seeking judgment in
favor of the corporation against both the defeated and elected directors
for the amount of the corporate funds thus expended. The court, therefore, was presented with the propriety of the use of corporate funds by
both the defeated management and the successful opposition. Both
parties to the action moved for summary judgment. The judge denied
both motions because he found there was a material issue of fact:
namely, did the contest involve material issues of corporate policy or
was the struggle just for control of the corporation?
The judge easily disposed of the question of management's expenses
by citing the many cases which have upheld management's right to use
corporate funds. However, since none of these cases authorized the reimbursement of successful insurgents, that question had to be determined de novo. The judge's reasoning, approving such reimbursement,
was as follows:
No case has been called to my attention which, in a "policy" controversy,
either allowed or disallowed the reimbursement of an insurgent group for
the expenses incurred by it in bringing about a change of management.
My own choice is to draw no distinction between the "ins" and the successful "outs." I see no reason why the stockholders should not be free to reimburse those whose expenditures succeeded in ridding a corporation of
a policy frowned upon by a majority of the stockholders. Once we assert
that incumbent directors may employ corporate funds in policy contests
to advocate their views to the stockholders even if the stockholders ultimately reject their views, it seems permissible to me that those who advocate a contrary policy and succeed in securing approval from the stockholders should be able to receive reimbursement, at least where there is
approval by both the board of directors and a majority of the stock-

holders. An analogy may be found in the reimbursement of the successful
stockholder who brings a derivative action for the benefit of the corporation.
There he is reimbursed regardless of the views of the stockholders. (Emphasis added.) 70
The second case dealing with the right of successful insurgents to
reimbursement is the Fairchildcase, decided by the New York Court of
71
Appeals in 1955 on the basis of New York law, and discussed above.
In this case, it has been seen, the new board of directors, elected by the
insurgents, voted to reimburse the insurgents for their expenses aggregating $127,556, and the stockholders, at the next annual meeting, approved
such reimbursement.
The Court of Appeals, by a four-to-three decision affirmed the dismissal of the complaint by the lower courts. Three of the four prevail70

Id. at 607-08. The apparent inconsistency in the italicized material is explained infra

pp. 22-23.
71

See p. 8 supra.
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ing judges, without attempting to discuss the legal problems involved,
merely stated:
It is also our view that the members of the so-called new group could
be reimbursed by the corporation for their expenditures in-this contest by
affirmative vote of the stockholders. With regard to these ultimately successful contestants, as the Appellate Division below has noted, there was,
of course, "no duty ... to set forth the facts, with corresponding obligation
of the corporation to pay for such expense". However, where a majority
of the stockholders chose-in this case by a vote of 16 to 1-to reimburse
the successful contestants for achieving the very end sought and voted for
by them as owners of the corporation, we see no reason to deny the effect
of their ratification nor to hold the corporate body powerless to determine
how its own monies shall be spent.
The rule then which we adopt is simply this: ... The stockholders, more-

over, have the right to reimburse successful contestants for the reasonable
and bona fide expenses incurred
by them in any such policy contest, sub72
ject to like court scrutiny.
The fourth of the prevailing judges, concurring in the affirmance of the
lower courts, made no mention whatsoever of the problem whether insurgents, as a matter of law, could be reimbursed. He merely stated:
Some of the payments attacked in this suit were, on their face, for lawful
purposes and apparently reasonable in amount, but, as to others, the record
simply does not contain evidentiary
bases for a determination as to either
73
lawfulness or reasonableness.
It would seem, however, that if he believed that reimbursement of successful insurgents was utterly unlawful (as did the three dissenting
judges) he would have so stated-particularly in view of his later statement that if an expenditure was "intrinsically unlawful," heavy stockholder approval or corporate benefit would make no difference. Moreover, if he considered such payments unlawful, there would have been
no need to produce evidence with respect to the illegality of such reimbursement. It thus appears that this fourth judge also was of the
opinion that reimbursement of successful insurgents, when ratified by a
majority of stockholders, and subject to the limitation of reasonableness,
was lawful. 4
The three dissenting judges were of the opinion that such reimbursement of successful insurgents was absolutely illegal. They based their
position on both legal and public policy grounds. 75 They stated that the
72 Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 173, 128 N.E.2d 291,
293 (1955).
73 Id. at 175, 128 N.E.2d at 294.
74 Accord: Note, 41 Cornell L.Q. 714, 717 (1956).
75 "The corporation lacks power to defray the expenses of the insurgents in their entirety. The insurgents were not charged with responsibility for operating the company."
309 N.Y. 168, 185, 128 N.E.2d 291, 295 (1955).
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insurgents, as distinguished from the management, were under no duty
to inform the stockholders or manage the corporation; that a change in
management was not a determination on the merits of management; that
it was a matter of business jugment and that the courts could not "indulge
in a speculative inquiry" into whether the corporation benefited by the
change in management; that if the insurgents "choose to employ the
costly modern media of mass persuasion ' 76 they should look to themselves for reimbursement; and that if reimbursement was conditioned on
success, it would lead to taking of greater risks and greatly increase the
cost of stockholders' meetings.7 7
It thus appears that, under the law of Delaware and probably New
York, successful insurgents may be reimbursed out of corporate funds
for their expenses in a proxy contest, provided such reimbursement is
ratified by a majority of the stockholders and subject to the limitation
78
that such expenses were reasonable, both as to nature and amount.
Undoubtedly, this right of reimbursement is also subject to the amorphous requirement that the expenses were incurred in connection with a
contest over policy rather than merely for personal control.
No doubt, there is fertile ground for criticism of the legal theories on
which such right to reimbursement is based. While question may be
raised whether such reimbursement serves a "corporate purpose" as
heretofore defined, it can be said that if a corporate purpose is served
by management's expenditure of funds in order to explain and defend
its position in a contest involving "policy," then a similar corporate purpose is served by reimbursing successful insurgents who incurred expenses in attacking and exposing management's record and "policy."
In both cases, it may be argued that the corporate purpose served is that
of informing the stockholders and bringing about an examination of
corporate policy and affairs, which thereby facilitate a more intelligent
exercise of judgment on the part of better informed stockholders. This
theory rather conveniently closes its eyes to the fact that the effort to
gain or retain control for personal reasons is often an important, if not
the primary, motive.
Id. at 185, 128 N.E.2d at 295.
Id. at 186, 128 N.E.2d at 296.
78 See also Cullom v. Simmonds, 285 App. Div. 1051, 139 N.Y.S.2d 401 (2d Dep't 1955).
In a stockholder action to recover solicitation expenses reimbursed to the successful insurgents by the new board of directors, the court, in a memorandum opinion, held sufficient
a complaint which alleged that there were no matters of "policy" involved in the contest,
and that specific expenditures were unreasonable. Although the complaint also alleged that
the stockholders had not approved the reimbursement, the court did not pass on the
necessity or effect of this allegation. This decision' appears consistent with the majority
opinion in the Fairchild case, discussed supra p. 8.
76
77
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It may also be argued that if reimbursement of successful insurgents
serves a corporate purpose and is lawful, then ratification by the stockholders is unnecessary. Stockholder ratification of an unlawful payment,
unless unanimous, is of no effect; 79 and by parity of reasoning, it would
seem that if a payment is lawful, ratification is unnecessary. This thought
seemed t6- be present in the federal court's reasoning in the Steinberg
case, when it said:
Once we assert that incumbent directors may employ corporate funds in
policy contests to advocate their views to the stockholders even if the
stockholders ultimately reject their views, it seems permissible to me that
those who advocate a contrary policy and succeed in securing approval from
the stockholders should be able to receive reimbursement, at least where
there is approval by both the board of directors and a majority of the stockholders. An analogy may be found in the reimbursement of the successful
stockholder who brings a derivative action for the benefit of the corporation.
There he is reimbursed regardless of the views of the stockholders. 80
The reference to stockholder approval seems to have been merely an
added reason. The reference to reimbursement in a stockholder's derivative action, which is granted without stockholder approval, suggests
that such approval likewise may not be a necessary condition to reimbursement of successful insurgents.
The decisions in the Steinberg and Fairchildcases indicate that while
the courts struggled with the older concepts of corporate purpose, they
felt obliged to adjust those concepts to cope with the practical necessities
arising from modern corporate practice. The fact that a majority of
stockholders have approved the use of corporate funds to reimburse
successful insurgents adds a strong practical sanction, even though a
considerable body of respected authority holds that a majority of stockholders cannot ratify an illegal act over the objection of a single dissident.81 The courts apparently believe that sufficient protection against
abuse is afforded to minority stockholders by the requirement of "reasonableness" which only the courts ultimately can determine. The courts
thus have evolved a doctrine which is a departure from former concepts,
but which is designed to meet the practical problems of modern corporations.
As indicated above, there may be room for logical argument that since
Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
81 Pollitz v. Wabash Ry., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912); Continental Securities Co.
v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912); Schwab v. E. G. Potter Co., 129 App.
Div. 56, 113 N.Y. Supp. 439 (1st Dep't 1908); Davis v. Congregation Beth Tephila Israel,
40 App. Div. 424, 57 N.Y. Supp. 1015 (1899); 2 Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations §§ 764,
767, 3432, 5795 (Perm. ed. 1954).
79
80
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the reasonable expenditures of successful insurgents served a corporate
purpose, the board of directors alone, and without approval of the
stockholders, may authorize reimbursement for such expenses. However,
no court as yet has so held; and it is doubted whether any court will
be willing to sanction such reimbursement without stockholder approval.
Another interesting situation is presented where the insurgents are
only partially successful. The insurgents, by reason of cumulative voting, may succeed in electing certain of its candidates, who may constitute
a minority, or even a majority, of the board. Or the contest may result
in a compromise in which membership on the board will be divided between management and the insurgents, with either the management or
insurgents having the majority. Or the insurgents may fail to elect any
member of the board but succeed in having certain resolutions adopted.
Would the insurgents, in any of these situations, be entitled to reimbursement for their reasonable expenses in carrying on the contest?
No case presenting such facts has been decided. It would seem, nevertheless, that the doctrine and considerations favoring reimbursement
to wholly successful insurgents should be equally applicable to partially
successful insurgents, provided, again, that the stockholders approve
such reimbursement. Reimbursement, without stockholder approval,
would, in most cases, be undesirable and unwise.
REIMBURSEMENT OF UNSUCCESSFUL INSURGENTS

Suppose insurgents conduct a proxy contest and are defeated by the
management. Do they have a right to be reimbursed for their reasonable
expenses? Suppose the board of directors, believing that the corporation
benefited from the contest, approves such reimbursement. Suppose the
stockholders approve such reimbursement.
There is only one case where a court considered the right to reimburse"mentof unsuccessful insurgents for their expenses in a proxy contest. In
Phillips v. United Corp., 2 a minority stockholder sued the corporation
for, inter alia, $13,000, the amount he had spent in a prior proxy contest
which had been won overwhelmingly by the management. The court
found that no case or statute sustained the right of the plaintiff to sue
the corporation on any such claim, and added "it would be difficult to find
any reason for saddling plaintiff's proxy expenses on the corporation."
The opinion of the three prevailing judges in the Fairchild case referred specifically to reimbursement of successful insurgents. There was
no reference to unsuccessful insurgents and very little discussion of the
82 Civ. No. 40-497 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1948), appeal dismissed, 171 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.
1948).
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legal theory supporting even the conclusion that successful insurgents
may be reimbursed.
The Federal Court in the Steinberg case, which approved reimbursement of successful insurgents, referred only to reimbursing "those whose
expenditures succeeded in ridding a corporation of a policy frowned upon
''s3
by a majority of the stockholders.
There are a number of law review articles, however, which suggest
reimbursement for unsuccessful insurgents. The rationale for granting
such reimbursement was well expressed in an article appearing in the
Columbia Law Review:
Yet it seems apparent that a full and fair presentation of the issues in a
contested corporate election cannot be made if the stockholders are given
only one side of the picture. And since the management whose policies are
under attack naturally feels called upon to justify them, its version of the
issues is more than likely to be colored to play up the favorable aspects....
Presentation of the latter is therefore left mainly to the opposition. Accordingly, the very reason that originally moved the courts to authorize
management expenditures-the need for informing the stockholders-further requires that minority stockholders be accorded similar rights. For it
is only through knowledge of both sides of the question, including development of all the arguments pro and con, that the stockholders will be placed
as to what course of conduct is
in a position to make an informed judgment
84
in the best interests of the company.
The same kind of reasoning is used by another writer, who points out
that management's use of corporate funds is sustained because it promotes intelligent exercise of shareholders' judgment and expression of
their views. But, he argues, "informed shareholder action cannot result
from a one-sided presentation, or no presentation at'all."8 5
It is readily apparent, however, that the recognition of the right to
reimbursement on the part of unsuccessful insurgents can lead to many
practical difficulties, and open up a veritable "Pandora's box." Obviously,
wholly irresponsible contests should not be encouraged. On the other
hand, in other situations, intelligent criticism, even if unsuccessful, can
be beneficial and serve a useful corporate purpose.
Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
Friedman, "Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests," 51 Colum. L. Rev. 951, 958
(1951). See also Latcham & Emerson, "Proxy Contest Expenses and Shareholder Democracy," 4 Western Res. L. Rev. 5, 13 (1952); Mintz, "Use of Corporate Funds to Pay for
Proxies and Other Expenses in Fight Over Corporate Management," 8 N.Y.U. Intra. L. Rev.
90, 96 (1953); Notes, 41 Cornell L.Q. 714, 719-20 (1956); 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1132, 1133-34
83

84

(1956).
85 Note, 61 Yale LJ. 229, 236 (1952). This writer also points out that some of the
insurgents' campaign proposals may be adopted by the corporation even though the management wins the contest, and that the good of the corporation may be served by consideration of the views of the unsuccessful insurgents even though those views are ultimately
rejected.
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Authors of legal articles who have advocated reimbursement of unsuccessful insurgents have proposed various formulae which would limit
the granting of reimbursement.
One writer would condition reimbursement on the ability of the insurgents to obtain a specified percentage of the votes cast in the election
of directors (or on a proposal)-perhaps 10% or 15%.86 As an alternative to the fixed percentage basis for reimbursement, another writer
proposes a formula for "proportional reimbursement. 87 The formula is:
Management expense allowed

X

Votes secured by management

Votes secured by non-management

X represents the amount of the unsuccessful insurgents' expenses which
would be reimbursed from corporate funds, but in no event would more
than actual expenses be allowed.
It seems that as a matter of policy, as decided in Phillips v. United
Corp.,88 a corporation should not be required to reimburse unsuccessful
insurgent stockholders. However, if the board of directors finds that the
insurgents, by conducting the contest, rendered beneficial service to the
corporation, and if the stockholders approve, there should be no objection to reimbursing the insurgents for their reasonable expenses in rendering such service.
REImBURSABLE EXPENDITURES OF INSURGENTS

The above discussion has indicated the extent to which judicial authority in Delaware and New York has recognized the right of successful
insurgents to receive reimbursement after approval by the board of
directors and ratification by a majority of the stockholders.
Manifestly, any such right to reimbursement for expenses is subject
to the same "policy" requirement and to the same limitations as to
"reasonableness" as exist in the case of expenses which management may,
incur. Consequently, the discussion with respect to the expenses which
management properly may incur, is generally applicable to the reimbursable expenses of successful insurgents.8 9 This includes expenditures
for printing and mailing of material discussing corporate affairs and
issues, professional proxy solicitors, public relations counsel, legal coun86 Friedman, supra note 84, at 963.
87 Emerson & Latcham, "Proxy 4Contests: A Study in Shareholder Sovereignty," 41
Calif. L. Rev. 393, 436 (1953).
88 'Civ. No. 40-497 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 1948), appeal dismissed, 171 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.
1948).
89 See pp. 11-17 supra.
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sel, accountants and security analysts. All such expenses, it should be
emphasized, are subject to judicial scrutiny from the point of view of the
"policy" requirement and reasonableness as to nature and amount. Some
mention, however, should be made of certain types of expenditures which
are peculiar to the campaign of insurgents.
One of the first hurdles which an insurgent group often must overcome
is that of securing a list of stockholders. If management furnishes the
list pursuant to the option given it by Rule X-14a-7 of the SEC Proxy
Rules,9" the expense of compiling the list must be borne by the insurgents.
If the list is secured pursuant to the provisions of state law permitting
stockholder inspection of the stock books, money must be spent for the
clerical assistance necessary to copy the names and addresses and compile
the list. Moreover, management, at the outset, may refuse to supply a
stock list or make the stock books available. In such event, the insurgents will be obliged to seek a court order compelling the management
to submit the books to inspection. This will involve attorneys' fees and
court costs. It would appear that all reasonable expenses incurred by insurgents in obtaining the list of stockholders, including attorneys' fees,
directly related to the effort to communicate with stockholders and inform them of corporate affairs, should properly be included in the bill
for reimbursement.
An insurgent group, in certain situations, may have greater need than
management for the services of accountants and security analysts. A
frequent method of criticizing a management's record is that of comparing its earnings record with the records of other companies in a similar
line of business 'for the purpose of showing that the earnings of the
corporation should have been greater. Such an approach often will require the services of trained accountants or analysts.
Moreover, the insurgents may accuse the management of manipulating
the valuation of inventories in such a way as to overstate profits. Ascertaining these facts and explaining them to the stockholders require
the extensive services of well-qualified accountants.
It may well be argued that if successful insurgents, in a contest involving "policy," are entitled to reimbursement for reasonable expenses incurred in informing the stockholders about the corporate affairs, fees paid
to accountants or analysts for services such as those described above
should be included among the expenses which may be so reimbursed.
The same may be said with respect to personnel who assist the insurgents and inspectors of election in examining and counting the proxies.
In any large contest, it is customary for both management and insurgents
90 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1949).
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to appoint one or more persons to assist the inspectors of election. The
examination and counting of proxies often takes many days and sometimes weeks. Representatives for each of the factions, who work with
and assist the inspectors of election, perform valuable and important
services. Their expenses, which normally are very moderate, may well
be considered reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the actual
conduct of the meeting.
III

It is readily apparent that the problems related to management's right
to incur expenses in a proxy contest and the insurgents' rights to receive
reimbursement for their expenses are extremely complex. Difficult questions of legal theory and public policy are presented which neither statute
nor case law adequately answer. The courts, on a case-to-case basis, are
ri-fitted to supply the over-all answers and doctrines which are urgently
required. The answers should be furnished by the legislatures in the form
of comprehensive legislation which can be drawn only after a complete
investigation and study.

